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CROWDFUNDING: FLEECING THE
AMERICAN MASSES
Zachary J. Griffin*
This Note was completed March 14, 2012, prior to the JOBS
Act passing into law on April 5, 2012. The fundamental basis
of this Note foreshadows the consequences of exempting equity
crowdfunding from the registration requirements contained in
the Securities Act of 1933. To preserve the author's foresight,
this Note has not been modified to reference the crowdfunding
exemption subsequently created by the JOBS Act. However,
the issues addressed in this Note are still applicable despite the
new exemption.

I.

INTRODUCTION

As the United States economy continues to sputter along like a
beat-up station wagon, politicians in Washington are searching for
new ways to boost its prospects. Many, including President Barack
Obama, look to small business growth as a solution to our economic
woes. 1 However, such growth has been stymied by the lack of capital
available to small businesses. As U.S. House Representative Patrick
McHenry stated, "Lending to job creators and entrepreneurs remains
dismal, [and] we must find new and modern means for capital
formation to ignite our sputtering economy. "2 Such "ignition" will
come from crowdfunding, or at least politicians seem to think so.
Crowdfunding is a means of capital formation that connects
entrepreneurs with investors over the Internet. 3 Entrepreneurs can
post their business plans on crowdfunding websites, and anybody
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1.

Fact Sheet: The American Jobs Act, THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 8, 2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/08/fact-sheetamerican-jobs-act (outlining President Obama's plan to create jobs and
"get the economy moving").

2.

Crowdfunding: Connecting Investors and Job Creators: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on TARP, Fin. Servs. and Bailouts of Pub. and Private
Programs of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov. Reform, 112th Cong.
2 (2011) [hereinafter Crowdfunding Hearing] (opening statement by
Representative McHenry describing the United States' poor economic
environment), available at
http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/9-15-11Subcommittee-on-Tarp-Financial-SErvices-Hearing-Transcript. pdf.

3.

C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 12
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, at 5 (2012) (defining crowdfunding and
explaining how it works).
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connected to the Internet can contribute, or invest, in these
companies. 4 However, there is a catch; investors are limited in the
types of returns they can receive from their capital contributions. 5
Currently, investors cannot receive any form of security because
"crowdfunding does not mesh with federal securities regulation[s]. "6
The Securities Act of 1933 makes it illegal to offer or sell any security
unless the issuer has complied with the registration requirements
under section 5 of the Act or has met a registration exemption. 7
"Entrepreneurs seeking debt or equity financing through
crowdfunding will often be selling [unregistered] securities," 8 as
compliance with the registration process is too expensive for most
entrepreneurs9 and the Act's exemptions do not fit with the
crowdfunding model. 10 As such, there is a tremendous push in
Washington to create a new exemption for securities issued through
crowdfunding. 11
Unfortunately, the movement to exempt crowdfunded securities
overlooks the devastating consequences of such an exemption. In this
Note, I argue that securities offerings using crowdfunding should not
be exempted from the registration requirements of the federal
securities laws. Section II introduces the concept of crowdfunding and
its five different categories. Section III examines the registration
requirements under the Securities Act of 1933, why registration is not
feasible for most crowdfunded ventures, and the conflicts between
crowdfunding and the current registration exemptions. Section IV
discusses why crowdfunding should not be exempted, specifically
focusing on how such an exemption would severely weaken investor
protections and open the door for fraud to permeate the market. In
4.

Id. at 5.

5.

See 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (2006) (banning the sale of securities unless a
registration statement is in effect as to the offering; and barring the
offering of securities until the registration statement has been filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")).

6.

See Bradford, supra note 3, at 6 (explaining the legal barriers to
crowdfunding under current federal securities regulations).

7.

See 15 U.S.C. §77(e) (2006) (section 5(a) bans the sale of securities
unless a registration statement is in effect as to the offering; section 5( c)
bars the offering of securities until the registration statement has been
filed with the SEC).

8.

See Bradford, supra note 3, at 6 (discussing how entrepreneurs seeking
funding will often be selling securities that require registration or an
exemption under the federal securities laws).

9.

See infra Part III(B).

10.

See Bradford, supra note 3, at 6 ("The current exemptions from the
registration requirement ... do not fit crowdfunding well.").

11.

Id. at 89 (predicting a future statutory crowdfunding exemption).
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Section V, I address the arguments supporting a crowdfunding
exemption. Finally, in Section VI, this Note explains the flaws of the
proposed exemption passed by the House of Representatives.

II.

WHAT IS CROWDFUNDING?

A.

Generally

"Crowdfunding" is a term describing a new twist on a relatively
old practice of raising money. In the broadest sense, crowdfunding "is
used to describe a form of capital raising whereby groups of people
pool money, typically comprised of very small individual
contributions, to support an effort by others to accomplish a specific
goal. "12 The "new twist" is that crowdfunding now can involve
raising capital over the Internet, giving fundraisers access to
exponentially more contributors of capital.
Internet-based
crowdfunding has been utilized in a variety of situations, such as
For
funding political campaigns, charities, and art projects. 13
example, President Barack Obama used "advanced crowdfunding"
during the 2008 presidential election, raising over $100 million from
small contributions. 14 Although various people and organizations can
use crowdfunding; this Note focuses on Internet-based crowdfunding
used in business, specifically by small start-up companies .
. As the poor economy has made accessing capital even more
difficult, many small businesses are looking for viable alternatives to
traditional lending. 15 In response, various crowdfunding websites have
privately developed platforms for entrepreneurs to raise money
through crowdfunding. Websites such as ProFounder and Kiva help
entrepr:eneurs tap into the crowdfunding market. 16 One can think of
12.

Crowdfunding Hearing, (written statement of Meredith B. Cross, Dir.
Div. of Corp. Fin., S.E.C.) available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
testimony /2011/ts091511mbc.htm.

13.

See Orowdfunding Hearing, supra note 2, at 2 (opening statement of
Representative McHenry) (providing background on crowdfunding).

14.

See id. (describing an example of large-scale crowdfunding).

15.

John Tozzi, Entrepreneurs Turn to Alternative Finance, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 1, 2009, 10:50 AM),
http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/sep2009/
sb2009091_103601.htm (describing banks constricting their lending after
the credit crash, leaving entrepreneurs "shut out of traditional loans and
even credit cards ... ").

16.

See How It Works, PROFOUNDER, https://www.profounder.com/how-itworks (last visited Nov. 10, 2011) (outlining the necessary steps for an
entrepreneur to obtain financing for a project); See also How Kiva
Works, the Long Version, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about/how/evenmore (last visited Nov. 1, 2011) (describing the borrowing and lending
functions of the website).
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crowdfunding as posting a classified advertisement on a website like
Craigslist.com. However, instead of advertising a used bicycle, an
entrepreneur advertises a business concept and requests funding from
interested parties. The creator of Profounder described her website as
one by which "entrepreneurs come to our platform, createO a pitch,
[and] createO their term sheets." 17 Usually the pitch is in the form of
a business plan, detailing the business's goods or services and the
entrepreneur's plans for using the money. 18 The term sheets inform
the contributor what, if anything, he will receive in return for his
capital contribution. 19
Crowdfunding websites display the business plan/funding requests
on their site, where anyone with an Internet connection can view
them. 20 If a viewer likes a pitch or business plan, he "can contribute
anything from a few dollars to the total amount the entrepreneur is
seeking. "21 The contribution is made over the Internet, and the
exchange of funds between the contributor and the entrepreneur is
facilitated by · the crowdfunding website, which acts as an
intermediary between the two parties. 22
As society grows more comfortable with Internet transactions, the
world of crowdfunding is rapidly expanding.
Since 2005, one
crowdfunding website has facilitated funding for over 600,000
entrepreneurs. 23 A study found that the median amount raised on
that website for each entrepreneur was $28,583. 24 Many supporters of
crowdfunding tout the "small" amounts raised as an indication of low
Some
risk, 25 but this argument overlooks statistical outliers.
17.

Crowdfunding Hearing, supra note 2, at 22 (statement of Dana
Mauriello, Profounder founder).

18.

See Bradford, supra note 3, at 10 (describing crowdfunding).

19.

Id.

20.

Id. at 5.

21.

See id. at 10 (describing how investors find crowdfunded businesses and
the amount they can invest).

22.

See How Kiva Works, supra note 16; See also Bradford, supra note 3, at
10 (elaborating on the transfer of funds between investors and
entrepreneurs).

23.

See Statistics, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about/stats (last visited Nov.
1, 2011) (listing the latest statistical information regarding Kiva users
and loans).

24.

Bradford, supra note 3, at 11 (citing Paul Belleflamme, Thomas
Lamber, and Armin Schwienbacher, Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right
Crowd, 2 (Jan. 24, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1836873).

25.

See id. at 81 (discussing the individual investment caps placed on
investors under a proposed exemption by the Sustainable Economies
Law Center).
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entrepreneurs have raised substantial amounts of money; "the largest
amount raised in that same study was $82.l million." 26
B.

What Are the Categories of Crowdfunding?

Even though each funding request is unique, there are five broad,
yet distinct, types of crowdfunding differentiated by what the
contributor receives from the entrepreneur in exchange for his capital.
27
These five categories of crowdfunding are: "(1) the donation model;
(2) the reward model; (3) the pre-purchase model; (4) the lending
model; and (5) the equity model." 28
1.

The Donation Model

As the name indicates, under the donation model contributors
receive nothing for their contribution, 29 "not even the eventual return
of the amounts they contributed. "30 Although the majority of
donation sites are for charities and non-profit institutions, a few
websites seek donations for businesses. 31 However, since the leading
crowdfunding websites do not use the donation model, the majority of
small business~s will utilize one of the other models. 32
2.

The Reward and Pre-Purchase Models

The reward and pre-purchase crowdfunding models are very
common and tend to be used together. 33 Under the reward model,
businesses give the capital contributor some sort of "reward" other
than interest or a percentage of profit. 34 The rewards can range from
a "thank you" to a "personal assistant/ cabana boy for 2 weeks. "35
26.

See id. at 11 (citing Paul Belleflamme, Thomas Lamber, and Armin
Schwienbacher, Orowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd, 2 (Jan. 24,
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1836873).

27.

Id. at 14-15 ("One can categorize crowdfunding into five types,
distinguished by what investors are promised in return for their
contributions ... ").

28.

See id. (outlining the five different forms of crowdfunding).

29.

See I.R.C. §§ 170, 50l(c)(3) (2011) (describing how a contributor may
receive a tax deduction if the contributor itemizes and donates to a
qualified organization under the Internal Revenue Code).

30.

Bradford, supra note 3, at 15.

31.

See id. (describing donation model users).

32.

Id. at 16.

33.

See id~ (describing that even though the pre-purchase and reward
models are distinctly separate, they are typically used together).

34.

See id. (providing an example of the many types of rewards that
entrepreneurs can offer to potential contributors).

35.

Id. at 18-19.
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Under the pre-purchase model, contributors "receive the product that
the entrepreneur is making, "36 or "the right to buy the [product] at a
reduced price upon completion. "37 For example, when Josh Freese,
the former Nine Inch Nails drummer, sought funding for a new album,
he offered a combination of reward and pre-purchase benefits to
potential contributors. 38 If someone contributed $50 to the new
album, they would receive a "CD/DVD set, T-shirt, [and] a '[t]hank
you' phone call from Josh." 39 Here, the reward elements are the Tshirt and phone call, and the pre-purchase element is the CD /DVD
set.
3.

The Lending Model

The lending model of crowdfunding is also quite popular, although
it is often referred to as peer-to-peer lending. 40 In the lending model,
contributors loan the entrepreneurs money and expect repayment at
the end of a mutually scheduled period. 41
Depending on the
crowdfunding site, some contributors receive interest on their loans
and others do not. 42 On the leading peer-to-peer website, Kiva.org,
contributors do not receive interest. 43 The lending model may involve
the sale of securities and conflict with the federal securities laws; 44
however, that topic is outside the scope of this Note.
4.

The Equity Model

"Equity crowdfunding offers investors a share of the profits or
return of the business they are helping to fund. "45 Prior to halting
operations, ProFounder was a prominent United States-based equity
36.

Id. at 16.

37.

Id.

38.

Id. at 17-18.

39.

Id. at 18.

40.

See id. at 20 (introducing the lending model of crowdfunding, which is
an established and popular method of financing entrepreneurs and their
projects).

41.

See How Kiva Works, supra note 16 (outlining how the premier lending
model crowdfunding site works); See also Bradford, supra note 3, at 20
(describing generally the lending model of crowdfunding).

42.

Bradford, supra note 3, at 20.

43.

See How Kiva Works, supra note 16 (noting that not all lending model
sites give their contributors interest on the money loaned).

44.

See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(l) (2006) (stating that "the term 'security'
means any note ... "); See also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56
(1990) (leading case on "notes" as securities).

45. . Bradford, supra note 3, at 24 (describing the types of returns investors
can expect on equity model crowdfunding sites).
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crowdfunding website. Its co-founder, Dana Mauriello, testified before
the U.S. House of Representatives that her website offered "two term
sheet templates, either equity or revenue share. "46 Entrepreneurs
could decide which term sheet to offer, but Ms. Mauriello said, "It
could have been anything that was a security. "47
Of all the
crowdfunding offerings that give something to the contributor, onethird of them offer stock. 48 Since the equity model involves offering
securities without registering them with the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"), it directly conflicts with the Securities Act of
1933; as such, equity model crowdfunding sites no longer operate in
the U .S. 49 Equity model crowdfunding websites continue to operate
outside of the U.S., yet they lack approval from a major securities
However, that may change as an equity model site
regulator. 50
called "Seedrs" is currently seeking authorization from Britain's
Financial Services Authority to operate in the United Kingdom. 51 If
approved, it would "be the first equity crowdfunding platform
anywhere in the world to be expressly approved by a major securities
regulator. "52
Although each model presents its own interesting questions, this
Note will focus specifically on the equity model. The equity model is
the one that clearly involves the sale of securities and is currently in
conflict with the registration requirements of the Securities Act of
1933.

46.

Crowdfunding Hearing, supra note 2, at 22 (statement of Dana
Mauriello, Profounder founder) (testifying how her equity model
crowdfunding site, ProFounder, allowed entrepreneurs to choose what
type of equity return investors would receive).

47.

Id.

48.

See Bradford, supra note 3, at 24 (describing how many crowdfunding
offerings offer stock as opposed to some other form of equity).

49.

See Bradford, supra note 3, at 25 (introducing why there is a need for a
crowdfunding exemption under the securities laws).

50.

See Bradford, supra note 3, at 24 ("Because of the regulatory issues it
raises, the equity crowdfunding model is not common in the United
States. Equity crowdfunding is more common elsewhere, however.").

51.

See Crowdfunding Hearing, supra note 2, at 36 (opening statement of
Jeff Lynn, Seedrs founder).

52.

Id.
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III.

SECURITIES REGISTRATION UNDER THE SECURITIES
ACT OF 1933

The Securities Act of 1933 (hereinafter the "33 Act") primarily
regulates the process companies use to offer securities to the public. 53
Subject to certain exemptions, the '33 Act makes it "unlawful for any
person ... to offer to sell or offer to buy ... any security, unless a
registration statement has been filed as to such security. "54
A.

Historical Context

The '33 Act 55 was the first federal securities regulation in the
United States, enacted as part of the New Deal in response to the
1929 Wall Street crash. 56 The 1929 Wall Street crash involved a large
number of "fraudulently floated securities," and the congressional
hearings that led to the Act were filled with examples of "outrageous
conduct by securities promoters. "57 The '33 Act was considered the
"first federal consumer protection statute, "58 and it focused on
disclosure to investors. 59 The '33 Act's underlying philosophy came
from Justice Louis D. Brandeis's famous statement that "sunlight is
said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman. "6° Congress shared Brandeis's view, as it established a
framework of full disclosure in the '33 Act, thereby letting the
sunlight "shine in" on prospective securities offerings. 61 "The theory
53.

THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 15
(Thompson West ed., rev. 5th ed. 2006) (establishing the regulatory
framework for securities).

54.

15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2006) (describing the necessity of filing a registration
statement).

55.

The Act is often referred to as the "Truth in Securities Act." The Laws
That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).

56.

HAZEN, supra note 53, at 21 (describing the historical context in which
the '33 Act was passed).

57.

Id.

58.

Marilyn B. Cane & Peter-Ferola, Back to the Future the States' Struggle
to Re-Emerge as Defenders of Investors' Rights, 5 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J.
15 (2005) (citing THOMAS LEE HAZEN, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 1
(Federal Judicial Center 2d ed. 2003)).

59.

HAZEN, supra note 53, at 21 ("Instead, under the guidance of a federal
agency, the Act focuses on disclosure. The focus on disclosure was
based on the conclusion that sunlight is the best disinfectant.").

60.

LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: AND How THE BANKERS
USE IT 92 (Frederick A. Stokes Co. 1914).

61.

HAZEN, supra note 53, at 21 (describing how the '33 Act's framework is
"based on the conclusion that sunlight is the best disinfectant").
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behind the federal regulatory framework is that investors are
adequately protected if all relevant aspects of the securities being
Moreover, such
marketed are fully and fairly disclosed. "62
"information enables investors, not the government, to make informed
judgments about whether to purchase a company's securities. "63 One
of the foundational ideas is that investors should be able to make
"their own evaluations of available investments," which eliminates the
"more costly and time-consuming governmental merit analysis of the
securities being offered. "64
B.

Registration Requirements Under Section 5{c)

The key provision requiring registration of securities is found in
section 5 (c) of the '33 Act. Essentially, section 5 (c) makes it illegal
for someone to buy or sell any security unless (1) a registration
statement has been filed for the particular security's offering, 65 or (2)
a registration exemption applies. Thus, companies wanting to use
equity crowdfunding to raise money have two options: (1) register
their securities with the SEC, or (2) issue securities under one of the
applicable exemptions. Although this seems like a simple decision,
neither option is feasible for the majority of small businesses.
The main reason registering crowdfunded securities is not a viable
option is that it is too expensive. As commentators note, the cost of
registering a securities offering is prohibitive for many small
Typical registration expenses include the SEC
businesses. 66
registration fee, the Financial Industry Regulation Authority
(FINRA) filing fee, accounting fees and expenses, legal fees and
expenses, and printing/engraving expenses. 67 Further, there is usually
a significant discount paid to the underwriters marketing the issued
securities. 68 The total expense of registering a securities offering can
62.

Id. at 22 (describing the underlying theory of full disclosure and why it
is embodied in the federal securities registration requirements).

63.

The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 55.

64.

HAZEN, supra note 53, at 22 (indicating that when federal regulators
analyze securities offerings they focus on full disclosure, not merit, of the
underlying business).

65.

See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2006).

66.

Marvin R. Mohney, Note, Regulation D: Coherent Exemptions for Small
Businesses Under The Securities Act of 1933, 24 WM. & MARYL. REV.
121, 123 (1982); See also Bradford, supra note 3, at 42 ("Unfortunately,
registration is not a viable option for early-stage small businesses
seeking relatively small amounts of capital.").

67.

See GNC Holdings Inc., Registration Statement Under the Securities
Act of 1933 (Form S-1) (Mar. 1, 2012) (listing its registration expenses).

68.

Henry Blodget, ZipCar's IPO Underwriters Just Screwed the Company
to the Tune of $50 Million, Bus. INSIDER (Apr. 14, 2011)
http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-04-
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easily exceed $100,000, 69 while the SEC registration fee and FINRA
filing fees alone can cost upwards of $85,000. 70 Moreover, such costs
do not even take into account the time spent "by the company's own
employees in preparation for registration. "71 The median amount
raised through crowdfunding is $28,583; thus, for most crowdfunded
ventures the costs of registering the securities would eclipse the
amount of money raised. 72 As such, the registration process is not a
feasible option for the majority of businesses looking to use equity
crowdfunding.
C.

Applicable Exemptions from the Registration Requirements

Since registration with the SEC is not economically viable for
equity crowdfunding, entrepreneurs will look to the applicable
registration exemptions. Sections 3 and 4 of the '33 Act carve out
registration exemptions for a variety of securities and transactions,
saving a company from the costs of SEC registration. 73 The most
applicable registration exemptions for equity crowdfunding are: the
statutory private placement exemption under section 4(2) of the '33
Act, and Rules 504, 505, or 506 of Regulation D. 74
1.

§ 4(2) Private Placement Exemption

Section 4(2)'s private placement exemption is "the most widely
used statutory exemption" under the '33 Act. 75 Section 4(2) exempts
"transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering" from the
registration requirements of section 5. 76
The key distinction is
whether an offering is considered a "public offering."
14/news /29964429_l_zipcar-ipo-price-goldman-clients (discussing the
discount the underwriters of ZipCars received and how it totaled $50
million).
69.

See GNC Holdings Inc., supra note 67 (listing a total of $680,000 in
securities registration expenses).

70.

See Dunkin' Brands Group, Inc., Registration Statement Under the
Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-1) (May 4, 2011) (listing $46,440 for
SEC registration fee and $40,500 for FINRA filing fee).

71.

C. Steven Bradford, Securities Regulation and Small Business: Rule 504
and the Case for an Unconditional Exemption, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING
Bus. L. 1, 24 (2001).

72.

See infra Part II(a).

73.

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c-77d (2006) (stating registration exemptions).

74.

Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your
Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV.
879, 912 (2011) (detailing which exemptions under the '33 Act are
possible for companies engaging in crowdfunding).

75.

Mohney, supra note 66, at 124.

76.

15

u.s.c. § 77d(2)

(2006).
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Unfortunately, the definition of "public offering" is unclear, as it
"is not defined in [the '33 Act] or in [the] SEC rules under the
statute. "77 Initially, it would seem that the distinction turns on the
number of people offered. the security; however, the Supreme Court in
the seminal case S.E. C. v. Ralston Purina Co. drew a different
distinction. 78 The Court looked to the "statutory purpose" of the '33
Act and stated, "the applicability of §4(1) should turn on whether the
particular class of persons affected needs the protection of the Act. "79
If an offering is made to persons who are "able to fend for
themselves," then it is considered non-public, because such persons do
not need the protection of the '33 Act registration requirements. 80
"Ralston Purina and its progeny have established two overarching
factors that indicate whether offerees are able to 'fend for
themselves, "' 81 thereby making the offering non-public. The first
factor is that "no offeree needs the protection that registration
affords. "82 This factor focuses on the knowledge, or sophistication, of
the potential investors. 83 According to the SEC, potential investors
are considered sophisticated enough for this exemption if they have
"such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that
[they are] capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective
investment. "84 The rationale behind this factor is that sophisticated
investors can "fend for themselves" if they have access to the right
information. 85 As such, the second factor is whether potential
investors have "access to the kind of information which registration
would disclose. "86 The Court in Ralston Purina said that each
investor must have "access to the same kind of information that the
['33 Act] would make available in the form of a registration
77.

Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 74, at 912.

78.

346 U.S. 119 (8th Cir. 1953) (rejecting the SEC's recommendation that
the exemption include a quantity factor).

79.

Id. at 125. ·

80.

Id.

81.

Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 74, at 914.

82.

J. WILLIAM HICKS, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES
ACT OF 1933 §11.03[1] (West Group 1st ed. 2001)

83.

Potential investors are often referred to as "offerees." See id. at § 11:55
(discussing how an issuer "must prove, among other things, that all of
its offerees are sophisticated").

84.

17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1982).

85.

Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 74, at 914 ("where the offerees 'are
shown to be able to fend for themselves,' they do not need the
protection of the ['33 Act] registration requirement . . . " (citation
omitted)).

86.

Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 127.
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statement. "87 Thus, most courts have interpreted this to mean that
"section 4(2) requires an issuer to make available information 'similar'
to, 'the factual equivalency of,' or . . . the 'sort' or 'kind,' which
would have been found in a registration statement. "88
Both of the aforementioned factors 'sound the death knell' for
businesses hoping to use the private placement exemption for equity
crowdfunding. First, it would be very difficult for crowdfunding
websites to verify and ensure that all individuals visiting the site meet
the requisite sophistication levels. Some crowdfunding proponents
have suggested implementing a quiz to gauge visitors' financial and
business sophistication; then, only those who pass the quiz would
receive access to the crowdfunding website. 89 In theory the quiz idea
Even the most
sounds promising; however, it is impractical.
unsophisticated investors facing an at-home online quiz will find a
way to pass, be it through "Googling" the answers or having someone
take the quiz for them; the results will not reflect their true level of
financial and business knowledge. Such a quiz will not be adequate to
keep out unsophisticated investors that need the '33 Act's protection.
Even if a quiz is found adequate to exclude unsophisticated
investors, the cost of complying with the "access to information"
factor is prohibitively high. Since investors must have access to the
same type of information found in a registration statement, "the costs
associated with providing the appropriate level of information to
offerees over the Internet . . . are high in relation to the benefit
sought, which in most cases is a relatively small amount of funding." 90
Moreover, the most prohibitive language under § 4(2)'s private
placement exemption is the restriction on public solicitation or
advertising. The SEC has indicated that any "public advertising of
the offerings would, of course, be incompatible with a claim of private
offering. "91
Yet, crowdfunding relies on public solicitation and
advertising to draw in the "crowd" of investors. 92 The whole point of
utilizing the Internet is that it allows entrepreneurs to advertise their
87.

Id. at 125-26.

88.

HICKS, supra note 82, at § 11:108 (citing Koehler v. Pulvers, 614 F.
Supp. 829, 842 (S.D. Cal. 1985); Bayoud v. Ballard, 404 F. Supp. 417,
423 (N.D. Tex. 1975); Parvin v. Davis Oil Co., 524 F.2d 112, 118 (9th .
Cir. 1975); Van Dyke v. Coburn Enters, Inc., 8973 F.2d 1094, 1098 (8th
Cir. 1989)).

89.

See Crowdfunding HeaTing, supra note 2, at 98 (statement of Lynn,
Seedrs founder) (discussing the quiz that investors will have to take in
order to invest on Seedrs).

90.

Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 74, at 916.

91.

Non-Public Offering Exemption, Sec. Act Release No. 33-4552, 1962 WL
69540, 2 (Nov. 6, 1962).

92.

See supra Part II(A).
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business and solicit investments from anyone in the world. 93 As such,
an issuance of securities through crowdfunding would be in direct
violation of the restriction on public solicitation and advertising; thus,
it would be considered a public offering94 and render the private
. placement exemption inapplicable.
2.

Regulation D:

~ules

504, 505, and 506

Through the '33 Act, Congress empowered the SEC to adopt
additional exempted securities if the SEC found that enforcing
registration was unnecessary to protect investors and the public
interest. 95 As such, the SEC enacted Regulation D, which is a set of
rules that "provide exemptions principally for small [securities] issues
and small issuers. "96 The Regulation D exemptions are found in Rules
504, 505, and 506. 97 Rules 504 and 505 were adopted to fit under
section 3(b) of the '33 Act, which allows for exemptions of public
offerings up to $5 rnillion. 98 Rule 506 is a safe harbor for private
placement offerings under section 4(2) of the '33 Act, and it does not
restrict the size of the offering. 99
There are two important
characteristics that are common to all three rules, except in limited
circumstances under Rule 504: ( 1) the securities offered under these
exemptions are considered restricted securities, meaning that they
"cannot be resold absent registration or the availability of an
applicable exemption;" and (2) "issuers and their agents may not offer
or sell securities under Regulation D using 'any form of general
solicitation or general advertising. "' 100

93.

See supra Part II(A).

94.

HICKS, supra note 82, at § 11:134 (discussing how mass
advertising/solicitation to people with no pre-existing relationship to the
offeror violates the prohibition on general solicitation or advertising, and
it does not matter if all of the offerees are accredited investors (citing
Kenman Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 21962 (April 19, 1985), [19841985 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ,83, 767)).

95.

See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (2006) (stating that registration enforcement
may not be necessary because of the "small amount involved or the
limited character of the public offering").

96.

Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 74, at 916.

97.

Regulation D Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/regd.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).

98.

See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (2006).

99.

See HICKS, supra note 82, at § 11:24 (describing how an issuer can rely
on the requirements of the rule instead of the interpretations of section
4(2) and what is considered a non-public offering).

100. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 74, at 916.

38T

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL.

4 ·No. 2 · 2013

Crowdfunding: Fleecing the American Masses
i.

Rule 504

Rule 504 exempts up to $1,000,000 of securities sold within a
twelve-month period. 101 Under this Rule, there are no restrictions on
the number of people that can be offered the securities. 102 Further,
there are no affirmative disclosure requirements, 103 unless issuers want
to sell freely tradable securities. 104
Rule 504 seems like the perfect exemption for equity
crowdfunding; however, the Rule still subjects crowdfunding to
general solicitation and advertising restrictions, 105 which are in direct
conflict with its fundamental nature. 106 The only exception to the
general solicitation restriction "is if the Rule 504 offering is subject to
state registration requirements or sold pursuant to a state exemption
that limits sales to accredited investors. "107 Yet, both exceptions are
prohibitively expensive in their own regard.
Registering a 504 offering at the state level could be extremely
expensive for many of the same reasons it is when registering with the
SEC. 108 As discussed in Part III(B), formally registering a securities
offering is prohibitively expensive for most businesses that would
utilize crowdfunding. 109 In regards to the second exception, limiting a
crowdfunding offering to accredited investors takes away the "power
of the crowd" that makes crowdfunding work. Generally, accredited
investors are institutional investors or individuals with a high networth/ annual income. 110 An individual accredited investor is someone
with: (1) a net-worth of $1 million, excluding the value of the person's
primary residence; or (2) an annual income exceeding $200,000 for the
past two years and "a reasonable expectation of the same income level
101. Rule 504 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/rule504.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2012)
(introducing the purpose of a Rule 504 exemption).
102. See id. (describing generally the lowered restrictions and requirements
under a Rule 504 exemption).
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 95 and 98.
107. Bradford, supra note 3, at 47.
108. See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 74, at 920 ("[T]he cost of
complying with multiple state laws [in registering a 504 offering] could
be high, if not prohibitive.").
109. See Bradford, supra note 3, at 48.
110. See
Accredited
Investors,
U.S.
SEC.
&
EXCH.
COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/accred.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2012)
(providing a list of accredited investors as defined by federal securities
laws).
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in the current year. "111 Limiting crowdfunding offerings to such
individuals takes away the majority of prospective investors, 112
handicapping the model's impact and reach. Since neither exception
works for crowdfunding, it would still be subject to the restrictions on
solicitation and advertising, rendering the Rule 504 exemption useless.
ii.

Rule 505

Rule 505 exempts up to $5,000,000 of securities sold within a
twelve-month period. 113 This exemption allows an issuer to "sell to an
unlimited number of accredited investors and up to thirty-five other
persons who do not need to satisfy the sophistication or wealth
standards. "114 The rule requires that the issuer give non-accredited
investors disclosure documents similar to those used in registered
offerings.11 5 Further, like the other exemptions, issuers may not use ·
general solicitation or advertising to sell the securities. 116 For the
same reasons discussed in the previous sections, the restriction on
general solicitation and advertising is fatal to crowdfunding. 117 Also,
limiting the investment pool to accredited investors and thirty-five
non-accredited investors severely weakens the "power of the crowd"
that is crucial to the crowdfunding model of raising money .118 As
such, Rule 505 is also useless to those issuing securities through equity
crowdfunding.

111. Id.
112. Approximately 1% of Americans would be considered accredited
investors. See Robert Frank, U.S. Has Record Number of Millionaires,
WALL ST. J. (June 22, 2011, 10:30 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/wealth/2011/06/22/u-s-has-record-number-ofmillionaires/ (listing the number of Americans with net worth of over
$1,000,000); See also Americans Making More than $250,000,
ANNENBERG
PUB.
POLICY
CTR.,
(Apr.
20,
2008),
http://www.factcheck.org/2008/04/americans-making-more-than250000/ (listing the number of Americans making more than $250,000).
113. Rule 505 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/rule505.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2012)
(outlining the key purposes of Rule 505 of Regulation D).
114. Id.
115. Id. ("[C]ompanies must give non-accredited investors disclosure
documents that generally are equivalent to those used in registered
offerings.").
116. See id.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 95 and 98.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 114-16.
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iii.

Rule 506

Rule 506 exempts an unlimited amount of securities sold, and is a
"safe harbor" for the section 4(2) private placement exemption
discussed in Part III(C)(l).11 9 Similar to Rule 505, Rule 506 limits the
number of non-accredited investors to thirty-five and requires
affirmative disclosures to such investors. 120 However, Rule 506 goes
further and imposes sophistication requirements on the thirty-five
non-accredited investors. 121 The non-accredited investors, "either
alone or with a purchaser representative . . . must have sufficient
knowledge and experience in financial and business matters to make
them capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective
investment. "122 Moreover, Rule 506 prohibits the use of general
solicitation and advertising. 123 Therefore, for all of the same reasons
as the previous Rules, Rule 506 is useless to securities issued under
the crowdfunding model. 124
Thus, the current state of the '33 Act and its exemptions make
equity crowdfunding essentially inoperable in the United States, as
entrepreneurs using crowdfunding are prohibited from taking money
from the masses and issuing securities in return. 125

IV.

WHY CROWDFUNDING SHOULD NOT RECEIVE AN
EXEMPTION

Given that the equity model of crowdfunding conflicts with the
registration requirements of the '33 Act, there has been a recent
political push to create an exemption for crowdfunded securities. On
September 8, 2011, President Barack Obama unveiled the American
Jobs Act, which some have characterized as an "ambitious plan to
119. See HICKS, supra note 82, at § 11:24 (describing how an issuer can rely
on the requirements of the rule instead of the interpretations of section
4(2) and what is considered a non-public offering).
120. Rule 506 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/rule506.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2012)
(discussing key provisions of Rule 506).
121. See id.
122. Id.
123. Id. ("The company cannot use general solicitation or advertising to
market the securities.").
124. See supra text accompanying notes 95 and 98 (discussing how
crowdfunding is incompatible with both private and public offerings).
125. Equity crowdfunding could be used in the United States, however, the
website would have to restrict access to accredited investors.
As
previously discussed, such a system is not ideal because it does not
harness the full power of the crowd. See supra text accompanying notes
115-116 (discussing how the Rule 504 exemption is rendered useless).
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create jobs across the country and 0 put more money in the pockets
of American workers and businesses. "126 Included in the President's
plan is a call for "boosting access to capital for high-growth
President Obama spedfically mentioned that
companies. "127
something should be done to responsibly allow entrepreneurs to raise
money through crowdfunding. 128 Days later, on September 14, 2011,
Representative McHenry introduced a bill, H.R. 2930, into the House
"to amend the securities laws to provide for registration exemptions
for certain crowdfunded securities. "129 As will be explained, such an
exemption for crowdfunded securities under the '33Act is flawed in
both theory and fact.
A.

Flawed In Theory

Beyond the specifics enumerated in H.R. 2930, the general idea of
exempting crowdfunding should cause pause, not only to those at the
SEC, but also to mainstream America. People quickly forget how
new the Internet really is, and that largely, it remains the modern day
"wild west." The Internet is certainly a blessing in many regards, but
it lacks systematic regulation and established legal precedent. An
exemption for equity model crowdfunding would likely open the door
for massive fraud, leave investors with virtually no protection, and
undermine the very purpose of the '33 Act.
1.

Massive Fraud

Unfortunately, the Internet and fraud tend to go hand-in-hand,
and this will only become more apparent if equity crowdfunding
receives a registration exemption. Most people have heard of cybercrime and Internet fraud, 130 and such activity is only becoming more

126. Aneesh Chopra & Tom Kalil, The President's American Jobs Act:
Fueling Innovation and Entrepreneurship, THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 8,
2011, 11:20 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/
09 / 08 / president-s-american-jobs-act-fueling-innovation-andentrepreneurship (discussing the unveiling of the American Jobs Act).
127. The American Jobs Act, supra note 1 (discussing how President Obama
will help entrepreneurs and small businesses access capital and grow).
128. Chopra & Kalil, supra note 126 (detailing how heightened access to
crowdfunding is a goal of the American Jobs Act).
129. See Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. (as
reported by H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., Sept. 14, 2011).
130. See James Marson, Small Victory in the Fight Against Global
Cybercrime, TIME Bus. (June 21, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/
business/article/0,8599,1998055,00.html (describing scareware: "one of
the fastest-growing and most prevalent types of Internet fraud"); See
also Michael Rothfeld, D.A. Cracks Down on Internet Crime, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 30, 2011, at Al 7 (The Manhattan District Attorney stated that
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prevalent. The Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's ("FBI") Cyber Division, Gordon Snow, testified before
the Senate, "It is difficult to overstate the potential impact [cyber]
threats pose to our economy, our national security, and the critical
Further, "the
infrastructure upon which our country relies. "131
number and sophistication of cyber attacks has increased dramatically
over the past five years and is expected to continue to grow. "132 An
exemption for equity crowdfunding would likely create another
opportunity for cyber criminals to take advantage of innocent citizens,
compounding an already worsening situation.
History often provides the best lessons for dealing with current
problems; however, it seems the Obama Administration has either
forgotten, or ignored, the massive amounts of securities fraud
conducted via the Internet during the mid-1990s. In 1992, the SEC
sought to "facilitate capital raising by small businesses by reducing
the compliance burdens placed on those companies by the federal
securities laws. "133 Specifically, the SEC wanted to reduce the burden
of complying with the '33 Act's registration requirements, so it
revised the Rule 504 exemption under Regulation D to "eliminateO all
restrictions on the manner of offerings and on resales under Rule
504. "134 The SEC's revision to Rule 504 allowed "a non-reporting
company [to] offer up to $1,000,000 of securities in a twelve-month
period and be subject only to the antifraud provisions and other civil
liability provisions of the federal securities laws. "135 One of the main
revisions was that issuers could use general solicitation and
advertising in offering their securities. 136 Unbeknownst to the SEC at
the time, this revision fostered massive securities fraud using the
Internet.
After the revision to Rule 504 in 1992, there were numerous cases
of securities fraud. 137 One of the main categories of Internet securities
"cybercrime is just, put simply, among the most prevalent crimes that
are confronting the office.").
131. Gordon M. Snow, Statement Before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
(Apr. 12, 2011), available athttp://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony /
cybersecurity-responding-to-the-threat-of-cyber-crime-and-terrorism.
132. Id.
133. Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, The "Seed Capital" Exemption,
63 Fed. Reg. 102, 29170 (proposed May 28, 1998).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See id. (discussing the significant number of allegations of fraud
involving microcap companies).
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fraud involved "pump and dump" schemes. 138 Pump and dump
schemes involved the stock of "microcap" companies, which are
"characterized by thin capitalization, low share prices, limited public
information and little or no analyst coverage. "139 Schemers would
purchase the microcap . stocks at extremely low prices and promote
them "over the Internet through the use of unsolicited email 'spam,'
chat rooms, bulletin boards, investment websites, or investment
newsletters. "140 These promotion ("pump") efforts would temporarily
drive up the stock prices, at which point the promoters would sell
("dump") the stocks to unsuspecting investors in the secondary
market. 141 The promoter would make a huge profit at the expense of
the
promotion materials often involved
other investors;
misrepresentations of the microcap stock, and subsequently the price
would crash after the promoter dumped his position, leaving investors
with virtually nothing. 142 ·This type of scheme was facilitated because
the SEC removed, · among other things, the restriction on general
solicitation and advertising. 143
In response to rampant pump and dump schemes, the SEC made
another revision to Rule 504 in 1998; however, this time it increased
the restrictions on Rule 504 offerings to their pre-1992 levels. 144 The
SEC seemed to realize that the cost of fraud outweighed the benefit of
easing capital formation for small businesses. The lesson that the
SEC learned in the mid-1990s is one that our current congressional
representatives should take to heart, especially since it involves the
same policy concerns about small businesses' access to capital.
Moreover, an exemption for crowdfunding will likely have the same
unintended consequence of creating massive fraud over the Internet.

138. Constance Z. Wagner, Securities Frnud in Cyberspace: Reaching the
Outer Limits of the Federal Securities Laws, 80 NEB. L. REV. 920, 922
(2001) (outlining the basics of pump and dump schemes).
139. Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, The "Seed Capital" Exemption,
63 Fed. Reg. 102, 29169 (proposed May 28, 1998).
140. Wagner, suprn note 138, at 922.
141. See id. (discussing how such activity could involve fraud "if the
promoter makes material misrepresentations .... ").
142. Pump and Dump Schemes, U.S. SEC. &
http://www.sec.gov/answers/pumpdump.htm (last
2012).

EXCH.
visited

COMM'N,
Mar. 1,

143. See Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, The "Seed Capital"
Exemption, 63 Fed. Reg. 102, 29169 (proposed May 28, 1998) (stating
that "general solicitation and general offerings are permitted for all Rule
504 offerings.").
144. See id. at 29170 (imposing resale restrictions on securities issued under
Rule 504).
·

393

4 ·No. 2 · 2013
Crowdfunding: Fleecing the American Masses

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL.

As oft stated, "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned
to repeat it. "145
2.

Inadequate Investor Protection

Many proponents of equity crowdfunding have advocated for an
exemption from the federal and state registration requirements,
arguing that the nature of crowdfunding makes compliance with the
regulations economically infeasible. 146 Commentators argue the cost of
registering with the SEC is too expensive for entrepreneurs who are
Further, since modern
ra1smg small amounts of money. 147
crowdfunding is Internet-based, many of the offerings would be
subject to the registration requirements of multiple states,
compounding the expense associated with registration compliance. 148
However, exempting crowdfunding from the federal and state
registration requirements takes away the majority, if not all, of the
investor protections under the securities laws. 149
A crowdfunding exemption would eliminate the strongest level of
investor protection. Generally speaking, securities laws protect
investors in two ways: (1) registration requirements that impose
mandatory disclosures; and (2) anti-fraud laws. 150 The registration
prong is arguably the strongest level of investor protection. 151 Within
that prong, there are state registration requirements (also known as
Blue Sky laws) and federal registration requirements. 152 The state
registration requirements vary, but some can have "a significant

145. GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON OR THE PHASES OF HUMAN
PROGRESS: REASON IN COMMON SENSE 284 (2nd ed., Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1905).
146. See Nikki D. Pope, Crowdfunding Microstartups: It's Time for the
Securities and Exchange Commission to Approve a Small Offering
Exemption, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 973, 974 (2011) (stating how the SEC's
"current rules are too restrictive and choke off nascent business with
overregulation").
147. See id. ; See also Community Enterprise, SUSTAINABLE ECON. L. CTR.,
http://www.theselc.org/programs/ community-supportedentrepreneurship/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
148. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 74, at 920 (arguing that "the cost of
complying with multiple state laws could be high, if not prohibitive").
149. See id.
150. Interview with David Porter, Visiting Professor, Case W. Res. Univ.
School of Law, in Cleveland, Ohio (Oct. 26, 2011); see also LOUIS Loss
& JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 28-30
(Aspen Publishers, 5th ed. 2004).
151. Porter, supra note 150.
152. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 150, at 9-15, 93 (describing state and
federal adoption of Blue Sky laws).
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impact on regulating fraudulent transactions. "153
Additionally,
'~ [u]nlike the federal securities regulation, state securities acts
generally permit a merit analysis of the investment before certain
securities can be offered for sale within that state's borders. "154 As
such, state regulators can evaluate the substance of a business and its
prospects for the future and thus can effectively vet out fraudulent or
pipe dream offerings. 15_5 The federal registration requirements are
uniform in nature, yet they do not provide for a merit evaluation of
the securities offered. 156 Rather, the federal registration laws focus on
full disclosure and SEC verification of key information, so investors
have adequate information to make investing decisions. 157
The second, and arguably weaker, level of protection comes from
the state and federal anti-fraud provisions. If Congress creates a
crowdfunding exemption, the registration protections will be
eliminated and the only investor protection will come from the antifraud provisions, which alone are wholly inadequate to deal with the
type of fraud that will likely be perpetrated through crowdfunding. 158
i.

Post Facto Enforcement

First, the anti-fraud provisions only allow private actors or the
SEC to sue after the fraud has occurred. 159 The anti-fraud laws do
not contain provisions for fraud prevention, because arguably that is
the role of the state and federal registration requirements. 160 The
mere existence of anti-fraud provisions does have some deterrent
effect on bad actors, but if the registration requirements are

153. HAZEN, supra note 53, at 330.
154. Id.
155. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 150, at 14-15 (discussing how a
coordination procedure is "achieved without sacrificing the traditional
regulatory philosophy of the states to the disclosure philosophy of the
federal statute.").
156. Id. at 35-36 (discussing the competing philosophies of merit analysis and
full disclosure, and how the later was ultimately the basis of the '33

Act).
157. See The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N,http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#secact1933 (last visited
Mar. 1, 2012) (discussing the "truth in securities" law).
158. Porter, supra

n~te

150.

159. Id.; see also 15· U.S.C. § 77q (2006) (the individual must take some
action - "use of any means or instruments" - to deceive or defraud,
before the anti-fraud provisions take effect; thus, any enforcement would
have to. logically come after the person committed a deceitful or
fraudulent act).
160. Porter, supra note 150.
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eliminated, there will be no warning signs for investors. 161 To clarify
Imagine yourself
this idea, consider a different crime-murder.
walking down a dark alley in a sketchy neighborhood. Murder
statutes have some deterrent effect on the unscrupulous actors lurking
in the shadows, but there are warning signs that something bad might
happen-the dark alley, the bad side of town, among other things.
With securities, you do not have warning signs of fraud without the
registration requirements. Instead, you are left with professional
salesmen telling you that a particular micro-cap stock is going to be
the next Google, and you lack any information with which to assess
his truthfulness.
As such, unscrupulous actors will certainly commit fraud, and
investors can only hope that the anti-fraud provisions will be there to
clean up the mess afterwards. However, this is clearly a flawed
strategy. "The key to protecting investors is to be able to act before
a fraudulent offering is made, not after the fact when the con artist
and the investor's money have disappeared." 162
Exempting
crowdfunding puts the SEC in a permanent state of "reaction,"
limiting its investor protection efforts to situations that have already
gone wrong .. Such a decision is simply poor public policy.
ii.

Lack of Enforcement Resources

Second, the evasiveness of unscrupulous actors on the Internet
makes enforcement of the anti-fraud provisions an insurmountable
task that the SEC is ill equipped to handle. "As cyber crime groups
increasingly recruit experienced actors and pool resources and
knowledge, they advance their ability to be successful in crimes
against more profitable targets and . . . learn the skills necessary to
evade the security industry and law enforcement. "163 Combating
cyber-crime takes a tremendous amount of resources; as the FBI
stated, "one agency cannot combat the threat alone. "164
The
significantly understaffed SEC is certainly not in the position to
enforce the anti-fraud provisions against widespread crowdfunding
abuse. 165 The SEC could recruit the assistance of other agencies like

161. Porter, supra note 150 (Jan. 27, 2012).
162. Marlene Y. Satter, Crowdfunding Bill Paves Way For Fraud: NASAA,
ADVISORONE (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.advisorone.com/2011/
10 / 28 / crowdfunding-bill-paves-way-for-fraud-nasaa (quoting North Am.
Sec. Adm'rs Ass'n President Jack Herstein).
163. Snow, supra note 131 (demonstrating that cyber criminals are becoming
more and more difficult to stop).
164. Id.
165. See Ben Protess, S.E. C. Is Severely Understaffed, Review Finds, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar. 7, 2011, 11:12 AM),
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the FBI; however, those agencies are similarly overloaded. In order to
handle its.cyber-crime caseload, the FBI had to reach out to "[twenty]
law enforcement and intelligence community . . . entities, including
the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, Department
of Homeland Security . . . and the National Security Agency. "166
Although the scope of Iriternet crimes that the FBI handles is broader
than the SEC's, it still shows the magnitude of resources required to
combat cyber threats.
As Professor Mercer Bullard stated before the House Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform, "There is no question that any
liberalization of the exemption rules will result in some incremental
increase in fraud. "167 It seems preposterous to pass a law that creates
an imminent threat, knowing that the Government lacks proper
resources to handle it.
iii.

Economically Inefficient to Enforce

Even if enforcement resources are increased and unscrupulous
actors are caught, most of these types of cases will be economically
inefficient to try. Securities fraud cases are difficult to prove because
the plaintiff or Government must show that the bad actor had
scienter, or intent to defraud. 168 As such, the plaintiff's bar will not
want to take crowdfunding fraud cases because litigation costs will
often exceed the amount the investors collectively lost. 169 This will
leave the SEC and the Justice Department to bear the full expense of
bringing fraudulent actors to trial. Unfortunately, the Government is
already spending far beyond its means 170 and is in no position to take
on the extra expense of litigating against these fraudulent actors.
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/07 /s-e-c-severely-understaffedreview-finds/ (quoting a Bloomberg News report that an SEC internal
review concluded that the agency needs to add 400 new employees).
166. Snow, supra note 131 (discussing how the FBI partners with other
government organizations to fight cyber crime).
167. Crowdfunding Hearing, supra note 2, at 95 (statement of Mercer
Bullard, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of Miss.).
168. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 150, at 1018-31 (explaining that in
securities law, 'scienter' refers essentially to intent); see also Lyle
Roberts, Paul Chalmers & Scott Lowry, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich &
Rosati, Recent Issues In the Pleading of Scienter in Securities Fraud
Claims (2005) (explaining scienter analysis in the context of securities
fraud),· http://www.wsgr.com/pdfsearch/pleading_of_scienter.pdf (last
visited Mar. 5, 2012).
169. Porter, supra note 150 (Jan. 27, 2012).
170. Why it Matters, FACING UP TO THE NATION'S FINANCES,,
http://www.facingup.org/why (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) (describing
how the United States has amassed a "staggering amount of national
debt and unfunded federal liabilities").
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3.

Undermines the Purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 and Harms
Those Most in Need of Protection

If Congress exempts crowdfunding from the registration process, it
will completely undermine the basic principles of the '33 Act, harming
those most in need of its protection. As noted in Part III(A), the '33
Act is considered the "first true consumer protection law," and its
The securities laws have always
focus is on full disclosure. 171
maintained a paternalistic approach to protecting investors without
financial sophistication or significant wealth. 172 If an unregistered
offering is made to such investors, the federal securities laws place
significant restrictions on the size of the offering, promotional
methods used, and the transferability of the securities offered. 173 The
paternalistic approach may be an attack on the intelligence of many
Americans; however, there is some credibility to the idea, especially
since the Bernie Madoff scandal showed that even financially
sophisticated and accredited investors can be duped into fraud. 174
An exemption for crowdfunding would take away all meaningful
protection for the unaccredited and unsophisticated investor. The
only "protection" left for such an investor, besides the anti-fraud
provisions, is that he will be capped on the amount that he can invest
through crowdfunding. Proposals have placed the individual cap at
$10,000, or 10 percent of income, whichever is less. 175 However,
$10,000 or 10 percent of an individual's income is not a de minimis
amount, especially for those on the lower rungs of the socioeconomic.
ladder. Yet, the crowdfunding model depends on middle to lower
class investors because they comprise the "crowd" the platforms rely
on for numerous contributions. 176 So, an exemption seems to "mak[e]
it much easier for scam artists to sell unregistered securities to
families living below the poverty line or seniors barely surviving on
Social Security." 177 Not only is that bad public policy, 178 it sends the
171. HAZEN, supra note 53, at 21 (introducing the '33 Actand briefly
explaining the historical circumstances under which it was passed).
172. Crowdfunding Hearing, supra note 2, at 95 (statement of Mercer
Bullard, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of Miss.).
173. See supra Part III(C) (discussing the registration exemptions under the
'33 Act).
174. For an overview of the Bernie Madoff scandal and the investors affected,
see Robert Lenzner, Bernie Madoff's $50 Billion Ponzi Scheme, FORBES
(Dec. 12, 2008, 6:45 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2008/12/12/madoffponzi-hedge-pf-ii-in_rl_1212croesus_inl.html.
175. See Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. § 2
(2011).
176. See supra Part II(A).
177. Crowdfunding Hearing, supra note 2, at 63 (statement of Mercer
Bullard, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of Miss.).

398

4 ·No. 2 · 2013
Crowdfunding: Fleecing the American Masses

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY&THElNTERNET ·VOL.

message that Congress no longer cares about protecting
Such a sentiment
unsophisticated and unaccredited investors.
completely undermines the very reason that the '33 Act was enacted
in the first place. 179

V.

COUNTER ARGUMENTS

Despite the enormous risks associated with a registration
exemption for equity crowdfunding, there is a strong movement to
push through such an exemption. As crowdfunding supporters seem
to be perennial optimists, they tend to focus on the possibility that
crowdfunding could revolutionize the financial industry. However,
when met with skepticism about rampant fraud, they generally defend
an exemption using four arguments: (1) crowdfunding's legitimate
benefits to society will outweigh the costs of fraud; (2) the Internet
community will flush. out fraudulent actors; (3) investment caps
provide adequate investor protection; and (4) that crowdfunding
websites have an incentive to independently drive out fraud.
A.

Redirect and Weigh

When presented with arguments about potential fraud,
crowdfunding supporters respond with the "redirect and weigh,"
meaning that they avoid addressing the risks of fraud and argue that
the benefits of crowdfundi:hg far outweigh the costs. Essentially, their
argument is that "the increase in fraud will be offset by the increase
in legitimate business activity stimulated by the reduced costs of
raising capital for many of our most innovative and productive
companies. "180
Setting fraud aside, equity crowdfunding has the potential to
jumpstart our economy by closing the gap between small businesses
and their access to capital. Currently, small businesses have a.
tremendously difficult time accessing capital for growth. Institutional
investors, like private equity and venture· capital firms, reject 993 of
the business plans they receive. 181 Those institutional investors are
focused on what business "has the greatest chance for a lOx return in
the shortest period of time," rather than "who will create the majority

178. Id.
179. See HAZEN, supra note 53, at 21 (discussing disclosure to all investors as
a primary reason why the '33 Act was passed).
180. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 74, at 936 (quoting Dale A. Oesterle,
The High Cost of IPOs Depresses Venture Capital in the United States,
1 ENTREPREN. Bus. L.J. 369, 379 (2006)).
181. Bradford, supra note 3, at 103 (demonstrating the extreme selectivity of
venture capitalists).
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of net new jobs. "182
Often, the same can be said for "angel
investors," 183 leaving few funding options available for entrepreneurs.
Moreover, a recent study showed that:
[M]ost startups use lines of credit, such as credit cards ... to
finance their businesses. The difficulty with this is twofold:
fewer people have access to credit lines or home equity sufficient
to start a business. And second, . . . using a credit card with
high interest rates ... makes it tremendously difficult to finance
a new business. 184

As such, it is likely that many prormsmg small businesses go
unfunded, "costing the [United States] an unknown number of jobs
and innovations. "185
Many proponents believe that equity
crowdfunding could help generate "over 500,000 companies and over
1.5 million net new jobs over the next five years" 186 if given an
exemption under the '33 Act. Indeed, closing the gap between small
businesses and available financing could give the economy the boost it
needs.
As much as I support economic growth and re-building America
from the grassroots, I still do not believe the benefits outweigh the
costs of fraudulent actors stealing from the venerable masses. The
statistics cited by crowdfunding supporters are speculative at best and
they lack credible support. This is not the first time our country has
experienced a recession, 187 and it is difficult to see what is so different
today that we should be compelled to change eighty years of securities
doctrine.

182. Crowdfunding Hearing, supra note 2, at 45 (statement of Sherwood
Neiss, FLAVORx Co-Founder).
183. Bradford, supra note 3, at 103 ("So-called 'angel investors,' wealthy
individuals with substantial business and entrepreneurial experience, ...
often invest on a smaller scale than venture capital firms .... A typical
financing round for an angel investor ranges from $100,000 to $2
million.").
184. Crowdfunding Hearing, supra note 2, at 2 (statement of Representative
McHenry giving insight on the financing difficulties startup businesses
often face).
185. Bradford, supra note 3, at 100.
186. Crowdfunding Hearing, supra note 2, at 46 (statement of Sherwood
Neiss, FLAVORx Co-Founder).
187. A History of Recessions, CNBC (Sept. 4, 2007, 11:09 AM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/20510977/ A_History---,-of_Recessions
(citing
the National Bureau of Economic Research; indicating that the United
States has been through twenty-two recessions since 1902).
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B.

Vigilant Internet Crowds

Another argument crowdfunding supporters raise is that the
Internet disseminates information quickly and efficiently, thereby
allowing the large web community to "whittle out people committing
fraud. "188 As one supporter stated, "Time and again we see if you
make a false move on the Internet it will only take hours before
millions of people know about it. "189 As social media, blogs, and
messages boards provide an easy means for Internet communication,
it is possible for someone to expose a fraudulent business to the rest
of the world by merely posting it on the Internet.
Putting this into a crowdfunding context, imagine yourself
browsing a crowdfunding website and finding an amazing business
plan for a doughnut shop in Biloxi, Mississippi. The business plan
looks so good that you find yourself thinking it is going to be the next
Krispy Kreme-the plan includes details about the business model,
growth projections, and the address of the first shop. Since you do
not live near Biloxi, Mississippi, you cannot verify the first shop's
location and that such an address 'actually exists. Luckily, someone
who lives in Biloxi sees the business's plan and knows that the
address posted is for the local cemetery, not a prime piece of
commercial property. The Biloxi native posts all over the web that
the securities offering is a sham. You quickly learn about the sham
and abandon your plan to invest in the doughnut shop.
Theoretically, web forums and message boards will "ferretO out
frauds that have been overlooked by the platform. "19° Commentators
have coined what happened in the doughnut shop example as "the
wisdom of the crowds. "191 The basic concept is that "even if most of
the people within a group are not especially well-informed or rational
... [the group] can still reach a collectively wise decision. "192 This
phenomen01;1 is not new, and can easily be observed on Amazon.com
188. Crowdfunding Hearing, supra note 2, at 98 (statement of Sherwood
Neiss).
189. Id. at 45.
190. Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending, 45
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 445, 464 (2012) (showing that where they have data,
users of web forums and message boards frequently perform monitoring
functions) .
191. Bradford, supra note 3, at 28 n.123 (citing JAMES SUROW1ECKI, THE

WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND
How COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES,
AND NATIONS 16-17 (2004) (describing Google as an example of the
wisdom of the crowds)).
192. Bradford, supra note 3, at 114 (quoting JAMES SUROW1ECKI, THE
WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND
How COLLECTNE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES,
AND NATIONS xiii-xiv (2004)).
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or eBay.com; on each of those sites, previous customers ·rate and
review sellers they have interacted with. 193 If a seller misrepresents a
product to a previous buyer, future buyers will be on notice because
of the seller's poor rating and customer reviews. 194
The "wisdom of the crowds," sounds good in theory, but it will
not work for equity crowdfunding. In scenarios like the sham
doughnut shop, crowdfunding supporters rely on three huge
assumptions: (1) that someone will uncover fraudulent information in
business plans; (2) that the individual will post the "truth" on the
Internet; and (3) that crowdfunding investors will see and read the
posts about fraudulent business plans before investing. If any one of
these assumptions fails, the whole theory collapses. Moreover, the
eBay and Amazon "wisdom" will not carry over to crowdfunding,
because those systems rely on consumer feedback after a
transaction. 195 In crowdfunding, after the transaction is too late-the
fraudulent actor will have taken the investors' money and run.
Submitting negative reviews or ratings about the "entrepreneur" will
not be effective because it is doubtful a fraudulent actor will ever post
another business plan under the same username. In addition, there
will be a problem of false or inflammatory posting. 196 It will be
difficult, if not impossible, to discern whether the commentator is
being truthful. "Any scam artist worth his salt will figure out how to
overload the comment system with false positives. "197 Therefore,
while the "wisdom of the crowds" theory can work for some Internet
business models, it will not be effective for equity crowdfunding.
C.

Investment Caps on Individual Investors

Another argument that crowdfunding supporters raise is that
equity crowdfunding poses little risk to individual investors because
an exemption will cap the amount each individual can invest in
crowdfunded securities. 198 The proposed cap on individual investors is
$10,000, or 103 of their annual income. 199 The theory behind the
193. See Rating a Seller, AMAZON.COM,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeid=53780
6 (last visited Mar. 10, 2012); see also Feedback Scores, Stars, and Your
Reputation,
EBAY,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/scoresreputation.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
194. See EBAY, supra note 193.
195. See AMAZON.COM, supra note 193; EBAY, supra note 193.
196. Porter, supra note 150 (Mar. 5, 2012).
197. Id.
198. Bradford, supra note 3, at 122 (suggesting that it is sensible to limit the
amount that individual investors may invest).
199. See Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. § 2
(2011).
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individual cap is that it prevents "investors 'from incurring significant
financial risk' because 'even a total loss . . . is unlikely to be
Essentially, even if the
financially crippling for anyone. " 1200
investment completely flops, investors should be able to handle the
loss because they were not allowed to invest their life savings. The
main assumption underlying this theory is that most people can afford
to lose $10,000 or 103 of their income. This assumption may work if
people are fiscally conservative and save a lot of their disposable
income; however, that is not reflective of contemporary society and its
spending habits.
The average American is not a "saver," and he cannot afford to
lose $10,000 or 103 of his income. Americans spend almost all of their
disposable income, 201 which is the "amount of money that a household
earns each year after taxes. "202 In the U.S., the average household's
disposable income was $37,690. 203 The average American saves 3.53
of his disposable income each year, 204 which equates to $1,319.15.
With the proposed crowdfunding investment caps set at $10,000 or
103 of an individual's income, many Americans could suffer
catastrophic losses. A 103 loss would cost the average American
$3,769, possibly leaving that person unable to afford necessary
expenses. Such a loss would wipe out a year's worth of savings, and
then some. The negative consequences are even more pronounced for
the poor receiving governmental supplements. Those individuals
cannot afford to lose any money, and if they are allowed to
participate in crowdfunding we are essentially letting them gamble
with taxpayer money. 205 Unless the proposed caps are significantly
lowered to amounts like $100 or 23 of disposable income, they are an
illusory form of protection.
D.

Crowdfunding Websites Policing Fraud

The final, and likely strongest argument supporting an exemption
is that crowdfunding websites have a unique incentive to police their
200. Bradford, supra note 3, at 123 n.626 (quoting Request for Rulemaking
to Exempt Securities Offerings up to $100,000 with $100 Maximum Per
Investor from Registration, SEC, File No. 4-605, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2010 /petn4-605.pdf).
201. See Personal Income and Outlays: November 2011, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE
(Dec.
23,
2011,
8:30
AM),
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2011/pillll.htm.
202. Blaire Briody, Better Life Index: U.S. Doesn't Rank at the Top, FISCAL
TIMES (May 24, 2011), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/ Articles/2011/
05 /24/Better-Life-Index-US-Doesnt-Rank-at-the-Top.aspx#pagel.
203. Id.
204. See Personal Income and Outlays, supra note 201.
205. Porter, supra note 150.
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own sites and prevent fraud. On a micro level, each website will have
a strong incentive to develop a reputation for protecting investors and
punishing fraudulent actors. Otherwise, if it develops a reputation for
rampant fraud, customers .(investors) will leave and seek more
reputable websites. 206 The founder of Seedrs, Jeff Lynn, stated the
amount of fraud "among good crowdfunding platforms is actually
going to be very minimal. "207 Mr. Lynn indicated that Seedrs would
"very quickly and very publically" pursue any entrepreneur that tries
to defraud investors, and that it would press criminal charges against
such actors. 208 As such, Seedrs will "establish a reputation as one of
the least favorable places to try to run a scam. "209 It is logical that
other crowdfunding platforms would take similar actions against
fraudulent actors in order to maintain their good reputation and keep
a solid customer base.
On a macro level, if websites do not collectively establish
reputations for punishing fraud, the whole crowdfunding market could
collapse.
As commentators note, "Any perception of market
unfairness or distrust may have serious effects on investor confidence
and investment behavior. "210
"Without a broad-based investor
perception of legitimacy, people will not invest in the market .... "211
This means if investors perceive that the crowdfunding market is
saturated with fraud, they will put their money elsewhere, like
traditional stocks and bonds. Thus, crowdfunding websites have both
a macro and micro level incentive to take a hard-line approach
against fraud, making the risk of fraud from an exemption quite low.
The micro and macro level arguments may be true in theory, but
they still rely on attenuated assumptions. Websites like Seedrs may
have the best intentions to drive out fraud from their sites, but there
is no guarantee that all crowdfunding websites will follow suit. In the
long-term, websites do have an incentive to pursue fraud and support
the crowdfunding market; however, pure market theory is not a
strong enough protection for the masses of unsophisticated investors.
As can be seen from the recent economic crisis, putting too much
faith in the self-correcting power of free markets can have devastating

206. Bradford, supra note 3, at 142 ("Reputational constraints should also
moderate a site's interest in pushing investors toward inappropriate
investments; a site that develops a reputation for losing investments will
suffer a loss of customers as investors move to more reputable sites.").
207. Orowdfunding Hearing, supra note 2, at 98 (statement of Jeff Lynn,
Seedrs Founder)).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 74, at 936.
211. Id. at 936-37.

404

JouRNAL OF LAw, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· Vot.

4 ·No. 2 · 2013

Crowdfunding: Fleecing the American Masses

consequences. Even "economics sage" Alan Greenspan admitted that
he put too much faith in such self-correcting power, and that the
theory was flawed. 212 Millions of people could lose their money
through crowdfunding before the market has time to self-correct and
weed out the poorly regulated websites. We should learn from
Greenspan's mistake and not rely on the self-correcting power of
crowdfunding markets.

VI.

FLAWS WITH THE RECENT CROWDFUNDING
LEGISLATION, H.R. 2930

With pressure building on Washington politicians to jumpstart
the economy, legislators introduced an act exempting crowdfunded
securities from the registration requirements of the '33 Act. This act
is called the "Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act" ("H.R. 2930"), and
the House of Representatives passed it on November 3, 2011. 213 H.R.
2930 proposes a new exemption that would fall under section 4 of the
'33 Act, 214 which covers exempted transactions. 215 The proposal is still
being evaluated in the Senate, which has also introduced its own
Since H.R. 2930 has
versions of a crowdfunding exemption. 216
progressed the furthest of any exemption proposal, it is worth
examining its language and numerous flaws. H.R. 2930 is riddled
with ambiguous language and loopholes, so this Note will limit the
discussion to the four most egregious flaws: (1) the preemption of
state registration laws; (2) high caps on the amount individuals can
invest; (3) the self-certification of an investor's income; and (4) only
requiring intermediaries to take "reasonable" measures to reduce the
risk of fraud.
A.

Preempts State Regulation

H.R. 2930 contains provisions that would exempt crowdfunding ·
securities offerings from the states' registration requirements, thereby
severely weakening investor protections. The language calls for an
212. See Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Flaws in Deregulatory
Approach, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, at Bl ("[A] humbled Mr.
Greenspan admitted that he had put too much faith in the selfcorrecting power of free markets and had failed to anticipate the selfdestructive power of wanton mortgage lending.").
213. See Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, R.R. 2930, 112th Cong. (2011).

214. Id. at § 4.
215. 15

u.s.c.

§ 77d (2006).

216. See Democratizing Access to Capital Act of 2011, S. 1791, 112th Cong.
(2011) (introduced by Senator Scott Brown and has not been voted on);
see also Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical
Non-Disclosure Act of 2011, S. 1970, 112th Cong. (2011) (introduced by
Sen. Jeff Merkley and has not been voted on).

405

4 ·No. 2 · 2013
Crowdfunding: Fleecing the American Masses

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL.

amendment to section 18(b)( 4) of the '33 Act, 217 which sets forth a list
of securities that are exempt from state registration. 218 As discussed
in Part IV(A)(2), preemption of the state registration requirements
takes away most, if not all, of the meaningful investor protections
under the securities laws. The exemption would eliminate federal and
state registration requirements, leaving investors with simply the antifraud laws for protection. 219 Alone, the anti-fraud laws are wholly
inadequate to protect investors from fraud, because the laws put
regulators in a permanent state of reaction trying to clean up the
fraud after it happens. 220 This is problematic because: (1) it is
difficult to find fraudulent actors that have fled with investor money;
(2) it eliminates any warning signals to investors of possible fraud;
and (3) it is economically inefficient to prosecute wrongdoers. 221 As
such, preemption of the states' registration laws is a major flaw with
H.R. 2930.
B.

High Individual Investment Caps

The investment cap on individual investors is too high, thereby
exposing the average American to unbearable amounts of investment
risk. H.R. 2930 states that the aggregate amount sold to any investor
in reliance on this exemption within the previous twelve-month period
must not exceed the lesser of $10,000 and 10 percent of an investor's
annual income. 222 Again, such an investment cap relies on the flawed
assumption that the average American can afford to lose $10,000 or
103 of their annual income. 223 This assumption is flawed because it
does not reflect the reality that most individuals save very little of
their income. 224 As such, a $10,000 or 103 loss could wipe out most
people's savings and then some, leaving them unable to afford basic
living expenses. 225 Thus, as written, the investment caps are too high
to adequately protect a large portion of our population.
Another flaw with the proposed cap is that the percentage is
based off of an individual's annual income, as opposed to

217. See R.R. 2930 § 4.
218. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4) (2006).
219. See supra Part IV(A)(2).
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See R.R. 2930 § 2.
223. See supra Part V(C}.
224. See supra notes 203-206 and accompanying text (noting that the
average American saves $1,319.15 of their $37,690 disposable income).
225. See supra Part V(C).
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discretionary income. 226 Annual income is the amount of money a
person earns in a year before taxes and expenses. 227 A person's annual
income is not a good baseline because it does not accurately reflect
how much money that person can afford to lose. 228 A better baseline
measurement would be discretionary income, which is "[t]he amount
of an individual's income that is left for spending, investing or saving
after taxes and personal necessities (such as food, shelter, and
clothing) have been paid. "229 Discretionary income is more reflective
of what an individual can afford to lose on speculative crowdfunding
securities. As such, if discretionary income was used as the baseline
for the 103 cap, it may be adequate to protect investors from a
catastrophic loss. However, such changes need to be made before the
exemption is passed into law.
C.

Self-Certification of Income

As part of the investment cap scheme discussed in the preceding
section, individuals must report their annual income levels; the
problem is that there is no verification of the person's truthfulness
and accuracy. H.R. 2930 states, "[A]n issuer or intermediary may rely
on certifications as to annual income provided by the person to whom
the securities are sold to verify the investor's income. "230 Relying on
potential investors to accurately report their annual income without
verification is preposterous. People will surely abuse the system; they
will inflate their annual income to invest more money in
crowdfunding.
The same type of abuse was seen during the housing bubble
through the pervasive use of "liar's loans. "231 Such loans got their
name because they were based on a borrower's stated income, not
226. See H.R. 2930 § 2.
227. See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1-2
(Foundation Press 11th ed. 2009) (explaining gross income, which
equals "all income from whatever source derived," must be reduced by
all deductions to find taxable income; tax rates are then applied to the
taxable income to find an individual's tax liability).
228. See id. at 1 (stating annual income is a figure that has not been reduced
by an individuals mandatory expenditures, like food, shelter, etc; thus,
it is not reflective of how much someone has left over to spend nonnecessity items).
229. .Discretionary Income, INVESTOPEDIA, http:/ /www.investopedia.com/
terms/d/discretionaryincome.asp#axzzlov6zCkru (last visited Mar. 5,
2012).
230. See H.R. 2930 § 4A.
231. See Bill Black, Why Aren't Honest Bankers .Demanding Prosecutions of
Their .Dishonest Rivals?, Bus.INSIDER (Apr. 11, 2011),
http:// articles. businessinsider .com/ 2011-04-11 /wall_street /29986099
_l_white-collar-criminals-white-collar-crime-professor-john-s-baker/3.
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actual income. 232 Lenders never verified the borrower's stated income,
so people inflated their income to receive a larger loan. 233 Once the
housing bubble burst, borrowers were stuck in mortgages they could
not afford, so many defaulted on their payments. 234
The same result will occur under R.R. 2930-an investor will
come across a convincing business plan and he will inflate his reported
income in order to invest more money in the security. Since most
startup businesses fail, the investor faces a significant risk that he will
lose his investment. The unfortunate part is that he is worse off than
if he had been capped at 103 of his actual income. By not verifying
investors' annual income, the effectiveness of the individual cap is
severely reduced and it invites abuse of the system.
D.

Merely Requiring a "Reasonable" Effort to Reduce Fraud

The proposed exemption does not impose enough of a burden on
crowdfunding websites to prevent fraud. R.R. 2930 merely states that
intermediaries involved in the issuance of crowdfunded securities must
"take[] reasonable measures to reduce the risk of fraud with respect to
such transaction[s]. "235 The word "reasonable" is extremely vague,
and it is useless to describe the type of care a crowdfunding site must
take. Reasonable care is "the degree of care that a prudent and
competent person engaged in the same line of business or endeavor
would exercise under similar circumstances. "236 This standard is
useless for equity crowdfunding because it requires comparison to
something that does not exist yet. Since "there are now no major,

232. See Mortgage Fraud
Overview, FANNIE MAE (May 2007),
https://www.efanniemae.com/utility /legal/pdf/mtgfraudoverview.pdf
(discussing the "stated income/stated asset abuse").
233. See U.S. Atty's Office, Sherman Oaks Woman Faces Charges in
Mortgage Fraud Case for Inflating Income in "Liar Loan" Applications,
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Nov. 23, 2010),
http://www.fbi.gov/losangeles/press-releases/2010/la112310b.htm
(discussing a woman being charged for her role in a mortgage fraud
scheme in which she falsely inflated her and her husband's income,
claiming they earned nearly $50,000 per month).
234. See Michael LaCour-Little & Jing Yang, Taking the Lie Out of Liar
Loans, CAL. STATE UNIV. 4 (Aug. 30, 2009),
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/15048/website_lacour.pdf ("Without fulldocumentation, especially when stated-income or stated-assets programs
are used, we find the default rate is significantly higher, even after
controlling for other risk factors .... ").
235. See H.R. 2930 § 4A.
236. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 240 (Bryan A. Garner, West Publishing Co.
3d. pocket ed. 2006).
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publicly accessible equity crowdfunding sites in the United States, "237
what is the baseline to determine if a site is taking reasonable
Theoretically, the first
measures to reduce the risk of fraud?
crowdfunding websites could take minimal efforts to reduce fraud,
thereby establishing the bare minimum as reasonable for future
comparisons. If passed as is, it will take years of litigation to
determine what fraud reduction efforts are reasonable. In the
meantime, investors will be left hoping that they picked the site that
does more than the bare rninimurn to reduce fraud. The Senate
should eliminate the vague reasonableness standard and insert specific
actions that intermediaries must take to reduce fraud.

VII. CONCLUSION
Internet-based crowdfunding is on the cutting edge of raising
money for small businesses.
Crowdfunding websites allow
entrepreneurs to reach millions of potential investors and pitch their
business ideas. 238 The non-equity models of crowdfunding have grown
exponentially over the past few years, and many think that
crowdfunding will revolutionize small business financing. However,
crowdfunding proponents want to take it a step further and allow
businesses to issue securities through crowdfunding websites. The
equity model of crowdfunding directly conflicts with the registration
requirements under the '33 Act and its applicable exemptions. 239 As
such, many are pushing for a crowdfunding exemption, and the House
of Representatives has already approved one version. 240
Unfortunately, legislators and crowdfunding supporters fail to see
the catastrophic consequences of creating an .equity crowdfunding
exemption. Allowing businesses to issue crowdfunded securities will
open the door for massive fraud to enter the securities market.
History has already shown that securities fraud runs rampant over the
Internet, and a crowdfunding exemption would take America down
the same destructive path. Further, an exemption would eliminate
all meaningful protection for the average investor, leaving him
exposed to unscrupulous actors without any warning signs of fraud.
The exemption will leave investors praying that the SEC will clean up
the fraud after it occurs; however, such action by the SEC will be

237. See Bradford, supra note 3, at 25 (introducing why there is a need for a
crowdfunding exemption under the securities laws).
238. See Bradford,
crowdfunding).

supra note 3, at

10

(describing the concept of

239. See id. at 25 (introducing why there is a need for a crowdfunding
exemption under the securities laws).
240. See Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. (2011).
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limited because it is ill equipped to handle the influx of crowdfunding
fraud.
The proposed exemption under H.R. 2930 is riddled with flaws
and it exposes the average American to unbearable risks without the
counterbalancing protections of the securities laws. H.R. 2930 makes
it easier for issuers to target middle to lower class investors; yet it
fails to properly protect such individuals who need it the most. As
such, the exemption makes it easier for financially unsophisticated
investors to gamble their life savings on highly speculative securities,
thereby undermining eighty years of securities doctrine. I realize our
economy desperately needs a boost, but an exemption for equity
crowdfunding is not the answer; rather, it is a political knee-jerk
reaction that will wreak havoc on the securities industry and the
economy as a whole. Congress still has time to reconsider its actions;
but if it goes forward with the exemption, get ready to watch the
fleecing of the American masses and the next securities blooper of the
21st century.
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